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Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has made it clear that Turkey and Qatar will not be included in any international force to be deployed in Gaza, even as discussions continue over the post-war phase of the conflict.
Following the first phase of the ceasefire between Palestinian fighters and Israel, preparations are now underway for the second phase. At this stage, there is a proposal to form an international stabilization force in Gaza with the participation of troops from multiple countries. However, Israel has stated that Turkey and Qatar will be excluded from this force.
Speaking in the Israeli parliament, the Knesset, on Monday, Netanyahu said the primary objective of the second phase of the ceasefire is the complete disarmament of Gaza and the surrender of weapons by Palestinian fighters. While an international force may work toward this goal, he emphasized that it would not include troops from Turkey or Qatar.
Netanyahu’s remarks have sparked fresh discussion within Middle Eastern diplomatic circles.
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Since the 2010s, China has advanced rapidly in developing modern military platforms. However, ongoing issues with quality, reliability, and sustainment persist within the PLA and among international customers. These problems are evident in critical components like sensors, propulsion/engines, mission computers, and advanced high-tech systems (e.g., laser/DE, unmanned systems). Even PLA media and doctrinal publications acknowledge equipment quality and lifecycle management as significant concerns, indicating an internal recognition of these persistent problems, despite continuous public displays of new systems and efforts to highlight the PLA's successes. Although China's military is rapidly expanding, with more warships than the U.S. Navy and a potential lead in combat aircraft over the U.S. Air Force, the quality of its stealth aircraft, warships, submarines, and aircraft carriers still trails the U.S. military.
The reputation of Chinese arms, often perceived as "good enough," has suffered due to several prominent export failures. These include issues with Pakistan's F-22P frigates, groundings and technical problems experienced by JF-17 customers, and recently reported operational difficulties with the Chinese SkyShield laser system in desert environments. Such incidents have been extensively covered in regional reports and the defence press.
Root causes are multiple and interacting: China suffers from chronic corruption, as evident by President Xi’s relentless purges targeting the PLA. Additionally, the uneven industrial base (gaps in precision components and advanced materials), maintenance/logistics shortfalls, procurement misconduct, and rush-to-show capabilities for political/propaganda are the reasons behind the falling quality of Chinese defence equipment. Analysts warn these factors could slow or complicate PLA modernisation.
China is the fourth largest defence exporter behind the U.S., Russia and France. But despite being one of the largest and modern military powers, its defence exports have not gained access to any significant market. Between 2020 and 2024, China accounted for only 5.9% of global arms exports, well behind America’s 43%. In addition, there’s little geographical diversity; Almost two-thirds of China’s weapons exports went to Pakistan. But this does not provide China with credibility on the quality and sustainment of the products.
Reports from regional defence press and investigative pieces document repeated sensor and radar defects (IR17 imaging sensors; SR60 radars) and engine/propulsion problems on early Chinese-built F-22P frigates delivered to Pakistan. Problems ranged from degraded radar performance under high-power transmission to engine overheating and crankshaft/lubrication issues that affected operational availability. These issues were raised publicly by Pakistani naval sources and defence analysts.
The Chinese firm admittedthat defective Gimbal Assembly motors were the cause of the fault, and these motors had not yet been repaired or replaced, jeopardisin g the ship's berthing operations. This situation has compelled the Pakistani Navy to operate the four frigates with compromised operational capabilities due to faulty critical components and inadequate service from Chinese manufacturers. As a result, some key mission objectives for which these expensive ships were acquired have been jeopardised.
Multiple third-party reports like regional outlets covering Myanmar, Nigeria and other JF-17 customers documented groundings and structural/mission-computer malfunctions (weapon-mission management computer anomalies; vibration/airframe issues) after export deliveries. These led some customers to ground fleets, declaring them unfit for operations, rendering the valuable investment a wastage. J-17’s poor accuracy and low weapon-carrying capacity caused Nigeria to purchase the Italian M 346-FA fighter jets. While JF-17 remains commercially successful, reliability concerns have been repeatedly flagged in export customers’ press.
Recent reports from defense blogs and mainstream outlets covered Saudi operational experience with China’s SkyShield laser counter-drone system, highlighting significant performance degradation in harsh desert conditions and raising doubts about the system’s reliability and maturity. These reports were operational/field based rather than manufacturer test claims and therefore, more reliable. The SkyShield system was acquired to meet Saudi Arabia's specific geopolitical requirements. It was anticipated to offer a cost-effective solution by integrating electronic warfare capabilities with directed-energy weapons. However, its failure in the real-world conditions, casted deeper doubts on the credibility of the controlled testing and the quality of the product.
Furthermore, a numerous export customers and analysts have publicly complained about frequent malfunctions, poor spare-parts availability and weak after-sales support, which together undermine confidence in Chinese arms sales and have slowed some export trajectories. These complaints gain further traction when PLA media, itself, empahsises the need to treat equipment quality as life-or-death for soldiers and to strengthen weapons’ whole-life management, implicitly acknowledging prior shortcomings in testing.
The following can be seen as the reasons for this failure:
1. Uneven industrial base & component choke points: the advanced subsystems (high-end sensors, mission computers, precision bearings, materials) remain dependent on foreign suppliers or immature domestic substitutes, elevating defect risk.
2. Rushed fielding & political timelines: the political pressure to display new systems (exhibitions, parades, prestige exports) can shorten testing/qualification cycles and push immature systems into service. PLA media pushbacks on quality suggest awareness of this tension.
3. Sustainment & logistics culture: the historical PLA weaknesses in maintenance and lifecycle logistics mean high MTTR (mean time to repair) and lower platform availability for complex systems unless logistics reforms are fully implemented.
4. Corruption/procurement distortions: investigative reporting and the Pentagon’s analysis have tied anti-corruption purges and procurement mismanagement to disruption in defence projects and delivery timelines; corruption can also degrade quality if inspections are circumvented.
5. Export after-sales & tech transfer limits: the frequent complaints from customers, not only about defects but poor spare-parts pipelines, limited training, and shallow tech transfer packages have exacerbated the problems and amplified the perception of poor quality.
The narrative of Chinese poor quality defence products and the system where redressal is weak and slow, recently, China managed to create a favourable atmosphere for its defence industry, In matters of defence investment, trust is valuable, due to the expensive nature of procurement of advanced products; therefore, narratives become more important than sales. Pakistan did the same for China during the May '25 India-Pakistan crisis. Pakistan falsely asserted that Chinese-made J-10C planes shot down five Indian jets, including three Rafales, a MIG-29 and a Su-30. The false narrative led the investors to compare Rafale, made by France’s Dassault Aviation SA, with Chinese manufacturers, driving up the latter’s stock prices. However, the absence of high-quality products, despite a glorified testimony for Chinese products, customers world-wide are seeking alternatives.
China has rapidly fielded modern platforms, but the modernisation trajectory is not uniform: a set of measurable, repeatable quality and reliability problems, documented both in export customers’ experience and in PLA internal commentary, persist in sensors, propulsion, mission systems and some cutting-edge fields. Beijing recognises these weaknesses and is investing heavily to fix them, but structural industrial bottlenecks, sustainment culture, and procurement governance mean improvements will be uneven and gradual. For external analysts and military planners, it is therefore essential to look beyond raw platform numbers and assess the PLA’s true combat capability through the lens of sustainment, fault rates, and operational availability. Until China demonstrates consistent reliability across its weapons systems, its defence exports will remain limited in reach, its military reputation questioned, and its strategic power projection constrained by the quality of its own hardware.
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Pakistan is facing a deepening poverty crisis that reflects the convergence of economic mismanagement, structural inefficiencies, and environmental devastation. Between fiscal years 2020 and 2025, the country has experienced severe volatility in inflation, GDP per capita growth, and sectoral performance, all of which have contributed to a sharp rise in poverty. The poverty rate, which had been declining for nearly two decades, has now surged to 39%, pushing an estimated 12.5 million additional people below the poverty line. This reversal is not merely a statistical anomaly, it is the result of compounding pressures that have eroded household resilience and undermined the country’s social safety nets.
Although food inflation fell substantially in FY24, offering a brief reprieve to the poorest households who spend nearly half their income on food, this relief was quickly offset by persistently high energy costs and elevated core inflation, particularly in rural areas. These pressures continued to squeeze vulnerable families, many of whom were already struggling to meet basic needs. Human capital development has also suffered, with over one-third of children out of school in 2024–25. The exclusion is most severe among female students and the youngest age cohorts, threatening long-term productivity and perpetuating cycles of poverty.
One of the most crippling contributors to Pakistan’s economic distress is the circular debt crisis in the power sector, which has ballooned to Rs 2.4 trillion as of September 2025, equivalent to 2.1% of the country’s GDP. This debt represents unpaid dues to electricity companies for power that has already been consumed but not compensated, creating a vicious cycle that stifles growth and drains public resources. To grasp the magnitude, Rs 2.4 trillion exceeds the combined annual budgets of Punjab and Sindh provinces and surpasses Pakistan’s federal development budget for three consecutive years. At the heart of this crisis are Independent Power Producers (IPPs), private entities operating under contracts signed since the 1990s that guarantee profits in U.S. dollars while shielding them from business risks. These contracts include “capacity charges,” which require payments for simply keeping power plants operational, and “take-or-pay” clauses that obligate the government to purchase electricity regardless of actual demand.
A government inquiry revealed that IPPs earned Rs 1,000 billion in excess profits through inflated costs and guaranteed payments. Yet, instead of recovering these funds, the government chose to pass the burden onto citizens. Banks now deduct repayments directly from consumer electricity bills before any money reaches the national treasury, ensuring zero default risk for IPPs while converting uncertain government liabilities into guaranteed consumer obligations. The Central Power Purchasing Agency, previously hamstrung by cash flow issues, now receives automatic funding through surcharges, guaranteeing IPPs their returns regardless of system efficiency. For ordinary citizens, this translates into a punishing reality. A shopkeeper earning Rs 40,000 a month must now pay Rs 1,130 extra, nearly three days of labor, just to service debts born from policy failures.
Fiscal consolidation measures have further exacerbated poverty. Indirect tax hikes have disproportionately impacted the poor, while real-term reductions in the Public Sector Development Programme (PSDP) have curtailed infrastructure spending and limited labor income opportunities. Although the Benazir Income Support Programme (BISP) saw a 50% increase in benefit levels between FY23 and FY24, this expansion failed to keep pace with the staggering inflation rate of 52.6%. As a result, the real value of support declined, diminishing its effectiveness in shielding vulnerable households from economic shocks.
Natural disasters have compounded these economic challenges, particularly in flood-affected districts across Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and Sindh. Over 11.8 million people are projected to face acute food insecurity during the winter lean period, with 2.2 million classified in Emergency (IPC Phase 4). These regions continue to grapple with reduced crop and livestock production due to heavy monsoon rains that submerged farmland and triggered disease outbreaks among animals. Livestock, a vital source of income and nutrition, has been decimated by fodder shortages and illness. Meanwhile, food price inflation, driven by currency depreciation, high production costs, and fuel price surges, has severely limited purchasing power, pushing already vulnerable communities into deeper distress.
Amid this backdrop of economic fragility, Pakistan’s currency appears deceptively stable. As of September 2025, the USD/PKR exchange rate stands at 282.01, having strengthened slightly over the past month while declining 1.94% over the past year. This apparent stability, however, is the result of one of the most aggressive currency manipulation campaigns in emerging market history. The State Bank of Pakistan has purchased $9 billion from the interbank market over the past nine months to artificially boost reserves and create demand for the rupee, despite market fundamentals suggesting otherwise. This intervention has kept exchange rate volatility within narrow bands, fostering a false sense of confidence among observers while eroding the foundations of monetary stability.
Such tactics mirror failed strategies employed by central banks in Thailand in 1997, Argentina in 2001, and Turkey in 2018, each of which ended in currency collapse. The historical precedent is clear: massive intervention against market fundamentals inevitably fails, with only the timing and severity of the adjustment in question. Pakistan’s foreign exchange market is particularly vulnerable due to its shallow structure, with daily turnover of just $200–300 million. Central bank interventions now account for 30–40% of daily volume, distorting price discovery and making stability exponentially more expensive to maintain as pressures mount.
Together, these factors paint a grim picture of Pakistan’s economic trajectory. The rise in poverty is not the result of isolated shocks but the cumulative effect of policy missteps, structural inefficiencies, and environmental disasters. From the crushing burden of circular debt and regressive taxation to artificial currency support and inadequate social protection, the country’s most vulnerable populations are being forced to bear the cost of systemic failures. Without urgent reforms, Pakistan risks entrenching poverty for millions more, undermining its development goals and destabilizing its social fabric. The illusion of stability cannot mask the reality of growing deprivation, and the time for corrective action is rapidly running out.
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Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan stated that Turkey’s main focus is now to transform the ceasefire between Hamas and Israel into lasting peace. He called for international cooperation in Gaza’s reconstruction and humanitarian aid.
President Erdoğan emphasized the urgent need for the rapid reconstruction of Gaza and the healing of war damages. He indicated that Turkey is playing an active role in establishing permanent peace between Hamas and Israel.
Speaking at an event in Istanbul, Erdoğan said, “Our goal is not just a temporary ceasefire but to pave the way for long-term peace.” He noted that his government is working continuously to make the agreement permanent and ensure lasting peace for Gaza.
Erdoğan added, “We remain cautious and restrained due to Israel’s past actions, but our efforts to establish peace continue.”
Last week, Turkey, Qatar, and Egypt acted as mediators for the ceasefire agreement between Hamas and Israel. Erdoğan expressed hope that this agreement would serve as a foundation for lasting peace rather than a temporary truce.
Highlighting the urgency of reconstruction and humanitarian assistance for Gaza’s people, he appealed to the international community to work together toward lasting peace and rehabilitation.
Source: Anadolu Agency
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Pakistan’s possible entry into the U.S.-brokered Abraham Accords, effectively formalising ties with Israel, is being met with fierce resistance and indignation across Pakistan. Rumors that Islamabad’s powerful military establishment might secretly push for normalization under American and Saudi pressure have triggered public outrage. Many Pakistanis see any recognition of Israel as a betrayal of the country’s core principles and its longstanding support for the Palestinian cause. The mere speculation of such a policy shift has raised alarms that go beyond politics as it strikes at the heart of Pakistan’s national identity and the sentiments of its people. However, analysts suggest that Islamabad could pay the ultimate price of joining the Accords to enhance its ties with the US.
For decades, Pakistan has maintained a resolute stance of no diplomatic ties with Israel until the Palestinians receive justice. The solidarity with Palestine runs deep in the country: from school textbooks to Friday sermons, Israel is condemned as an affront to Muslims everywhere. Pakistanis of all backgrounds, including even rank-and-file military officers, staunchly oppose any normalization. Ironically, Field Marshal Syed Asim Munir is spearheading the idea of joining the Abraham Accords to improve his personal image among Western nations.
The backlash within Pakistan over talk of joining the Abraham Accords has been swift and scathing. Islamist parties have mobilized crowds to preempt any softening of the country’s Israel policy. In early October 2025, the conservative Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) staged mass rallies in Karachi, with protesters chanting against Israel and denouncing its onslaught in Gaza. JI’s chief Hafiz Naeemur Rehman thundered that any paradigm shift in Pakistan’s Palestine policy “will not be tolerated at any cost,” explicitly warning the government against entering the Abraham Accords. Such rhetoric reflects a widespread public view that recognizing Israel would amount to siding with an alleged “oppressor.”
When reports circulated on social media about secret talks between Pakistan and Israel, Minister for Religious Affairs, Sardar Muhammad Yousaf, hastily reaffirmed the official line. He said, “There has never been, and will never be, any recognition of Israel,” calling Israel an “illegal state” and condemning its oppression of Palestinians. Such statements aimed to quash speculation and reassure the public that no secret deal was afoot.
Pakistan’s mainstream opposition parties are united in rejecting the idea of normalizing ties with Israel. Politicians from the religious right to the center-left have all echoed that accepting Israel is unthinkable and against Pakistan’s very ethos. Leaders from the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI-F) and Jamaat-e-Islami liken Israel to a dagger stabbed in the chest of the entire Muslim community, and insist that yielding on Palestine would destroy Pakistan’s moral stand on other issues like Kashmir. Even figures in the ruling coalition know there is no public appetite for a policy U-turn on Israel. To them, dropping the pro-Palestine posture now, under American pressure, would feel like surrendering Pakistan’s dignity.
Critics of potential normalization argue it would yield little benefit while inflicting grave damage at home. They point out that Pakistan stands to gain no significant security or economic advantage from ties with Israel. Instead, it would sacrifice its own “national ideology,” which has been a binding force for Pakistan. Observers warn that if the military or government attempted to push through recognition of Israel behind closed doors, the cat would be out of the bag, unleashing widespread domestic repercussions and chaos once exposed. Indeed, Pakistan’s society has a track record of vociferous street protests on the Palestine issue. Crowds routinely burn American and Israeli flags in anger, seeing a nexus of the US, Israel, and India allegedly conspiring against Muslim nations.
In late 2025, the US courted Pakistan as part of a broader Middle East strategy. Washington floated a 20-point Gaza war “peace plan,” and unprecedented U.S.-Pakistan interactions took place on the sidelines of the UN. Pakistan’s then-prime minister appeared to welcome the initiative, grateful for moves toward a Gaza ceasefire. But this tentative support immediately provoked fierce backlash at home, with many Pakistanis equating endorsement of Trump’s plan with an implicit recognition of Israel. Faced with uproar, Pakistani officials backpedaled. Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar publicly objected that the final U.S. plan was “not ours,” revealing that changes had been made to the draft Pakistan originally agreed to. Critics accused the current administration in Islamabad of “surrendering” to Washington’s agenda and betraying the Palestinian cause.
Beyond Pakistan’s borders, the prospect of its inclusion in the Abraham Accords has raised eyebrows and concern across the Muslim world. The Palestinian leadership and people would view a Pakistani deal with Israel as a grievous setback. Palestinians often cite Pakistan as one of their true allies on the global stage, noting how Islamabad championed their rights even before many Arab states did. For Pakistan to reverse course now would be a betrayal of its historic legacy of mutual solidarity and brotherhood, which has bonded it closely with Palestinians. It would send a dispiriting message that even the lone nuclear-armed Muslim nation has acquiesced to what many in the Middle East see as an unjust status quo. Regional rivals like Iran would likely seize upon such a move to lambaste Islamabad for abandoning the Palestinian cause.
The ongoing debate, fueled by reports of U.S. pressure and backdoor dealings, has been dominated by deep criticism and warnings of dire consequences if the policy changes. Critics insist that Islamabad must not forsake the Palestinian struggle. The Pakistan Army, too, is aware that forcing a pro-Israel shift could fracture its ranks and public support. As one observer noted, any Pakistani leader seen as bartering away the nation’s pro-Palestine commitment for short-term favors would face angry people and an enduring stigma of treachery. For now, Pakistan’s government is silent on the idea of joining the Abraham Accords, pledging support to the Palestinian cause. However, it is not the end of the road, as Pakistan could buckle under pressure from the West, tearing at the country’s social fabric, and isolating its leaders, leaving a legacy of bitterness that no tactical gain could ever justify.
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Pakistan’s juvenile justice system faces severe criticism for failing to protect minors, with cases of children as young as seven and even a nine-month-old facing terrorism or murder charges. Reports highlight torture, forced confessions, executions of juveniles, and misuse of blasphemy and anti-terror laws. Human rights groups accuse Pakistan of violating international child rights treaties and call the system inhumane, unjust, and deeply flawed.
The latest case of a 7-year-old boy from Balochistan, who was slapped with terrorism charges, reinforces the fact that Pakistan continues to be one of the world’s most failing nations in safeguarding the rights of juvenile offenders. Pakistan has witnessed several similar cases in recent years, in which concerns were raised over the treatment of minors in Pakistan's legal system. Inadequate legal protections, misuse of Blasphemy and Anti-Terrorism Laws, lack of juvenile courts, treating minors as adults, and improper detention conditions have led the international community to consider Pakistan’s juvenile justice system highly problematic.
The 7-year-old boy had just shared a post on the social media app TikTok, attracting anti-terrorism charges from the state of Pakistan. This sparked outrage among human rights defenders, even as the government tried to justify its actions. Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) slammed the action, calling it a “gross violation of child rights and due process”, and urged the government to protect the minor. “We demand the immediate withdrawal of charges, a thorough review of the FIR and accountability for the officials responsible for this alarming overreach,” it said.
During this time, another minor Baloch student named Aman Tahir was said to have been forcefully disappeared by Pakistani security agencies. In May this year, Aimal was allegedly abducted by armed personnel after his home was raided. The frequent abductions of minors led to anger among people. “This is truly heartbreaking and what’s even more devastating is the complete collapse of law enforcement and justice in Pakistan. When brutality goes unchecked, it’s not just a tragedy, it’s a national failure,” said Pakistani national Syed Ashja Rohan. . In one video, Pakistani security forces were seen beating a minor and later stealing his father’s bike.
Hania Riffat, a legal literacy and empowerment practitioner, said Pakistan failed to meet its international law obligations set under the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC). “A significant chunk of this criticism is premised on inhuman punishments awarded to juvenile offenders, which include death penalty, life imprisonment and corporal punishment,” she said. “Pakistan has a long history of corporal punishment being legal for juveniles which has attracted sharp criticism from human rights organisations and institutions.”
Shafqat Hussain was a juvenile when he was arrested for the crime of murder, which he allegedly confessed to under rigorous torture. His brother Manzoor said “His nails had been removed, and he was just saying to me that he was innocent and needed help. They burned cigarettes on him. I saw the marks.” Shafqat was later executed without any medical tests to ascertain his age. “No one from the government has approached him – no one has gone to the jail to talk to him. And no one has come to us to find out about his age, either,” Manzoor said.
A Christian boy Aftab Bahadur also met a similar fate. He was hanged despite appeals from the global rights organisations seeking mercy, as he was a minor when he committed the crime. Aftab would not have confessed if the police had not tortured him brutally, his brother said. Maya Foa, Executive Director at London-based human rights group Reprieve, called the hanging “a truly shameful day for Pakistan’s justice system” as Aftab’s lawyers were not permitted a few days needed to present evidence to prove his innocence. “This is a travesty of justice, and tragedy for all those who knew Aftab,” Foa said.
Islamabad has been criticised time and again as a death sentence cannot be imposed on a defendant under the age of 18 as per the Pakistani laws and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, said Justice Project Pakistan (JPP), a human rights law firm. “Despite facing continued censure from the international diplomatic community, the Government of Pakistan continues to sentence and execute juvenile offenders in violation of international legal standards,” it said.
Taking the child abuse to another level, Pakistani police had charged a nine-month-old with attempted murder. The baby named Musa Khan was arrested for taking part in a riot in Lahore. Musa was made to provide his fingerprints on a legal document. While the case was withdrawn later, the incident showed the negligence and systemic flaws within Pakistan’s criminal justice framework, particularly in areas of due process, child rights protection, and accountability of law enforcement.
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At the 60th UNHRC, India highlighted its victim-centered counterterrorism approach, stressing the human cost of cross-border terrorism, especially from Pakistan-based groups like LeT and JeM. Exhibitions in Geneva showcased survivors’ resilience, while India emphasized accountability for perpetrators, disruption of terror financing, and international cooperation. From the 2008 Mumbai attacks to Pulwama in 2019, New Delhi has combined memorializing victims with legal, diplomatic, financial, and military measures, aiming to deter future violence and ensure justice for survivors.
At the 60th UNHRC, civil society organization and NGOs have been making efforts to generate awareness and bring to the notice of the UN, the devastating cost of cross-border terrorism supported by Pakistan and India’s efforts in countering it. On 19th September and 23rd September, two photo exhibitions at the iconic Broken Chair displayed the human cost of terrorism through the eyes of victims who have borne the brunt of cross border terrorism. The exhibition on 19th displayed the community resilience and courage in fighting the scourge of terrorism. Community led programs supported by an empathetic state forms a formidable human-centered challenge to communalism and terrorism. The message from Geneva was clear, the world must take note of the human cost of such violence and use its mechanism to hold sponsors and financiers of such repeated carnage accountable through a multi-pronged toolkit.
For more than three decades, India has been one of the world’s most targeted democracies, repeatedly struck by mass‑casualty attacks and cross‑border violence. In response, New Delhi has framed a victim‑first counterterrorism posture that blends support to survivors with accountability for perpetrators and their enablers especially when plots are traced to groups long reported by international media as operating from Pakistani soil, such as Lashkar‑e‑Taiba (LeT) and Jaish‑e‑Mohammed (JeM). India’s approach is to protect citizens, help victims rebuild, disrupt the financing and logistics of terror, and, when required, impose costs on those who shelter or direct militants. Pakistan routinely denies involvement; India’s case relies on the record of specific attacks and designations recognized internationally.
India’s emphasis on victims is visible after every major attack, none more so than the 2008 Mumbai assault that killed 166 people, including foreign nationals. A decade later, national leaders publicly led tributes and memorial observances for the victims and first responders, keeping survivors at the Centre of remembrance. Support also means pursuing accountability beyond India’s borders when the accused are overseas. New Delhi’s long campaign to bring suspects in the Mumbai case before Indian courts culminated this year in the U.S. extraditing Tahawwur Hussain Rana to India, after years of litigation, an outcome widely reported by the international press as a step toward redress for victims. Earlier, India executed the lone surviving gunman from the 2008 attacks, underscoring its commitment to closure for families shattered by terrorism.
India’s position that key attacks stem from Pakistan‑based groups is extensively reflected in international reporting. JeM publicly claimed the 2019 Pulwama suicide bombing in Kashmir that killed 40 Indian paramilitary personnel, an attack that precipitated one of the gravest crises in South Asia in recent years. LeT, for its part, has long been linked by global media and governments to the 2008 Mumbai carnage. While Pakistan disputes operational responsibility, sustained pressure has still produced some movement: Hafiz Saeed, accused by the United States of masterminding Mumbai, was convicted by a Pakistani court on terrorism‑financing charges in 2020. In 2019, after years of lobbying by India and others, the UN Security Council listed JeM chief Masood Azhar as a “global terrorist.” Each of these developments mattered to victims seeking acknowledgement and justice.
India’s victim‑centered approach coexists with a willingness to impose costs on terrorist infrastructure. Following attacks blamed on Pakistan‑based militants, India has publicly acknowledged cross‑border operations: the 2016 “surgical strikes” against alleged launch pads after the Uri attack; the 2019 Balakot airstrikes following Pulwama; and in May 2025, strikes India said targeted nine sites inside Pakistan associated with LeT and JeM after the killing of 26 civilians in Kashmir. Pakistan has regularly denied responsibility for attacks and issued its own casualty claims. Even so, the international record shows India has shifted the deterrence equation, making clear it will not absorb mass‑casualty attacks without response.
Victims’ groups often stress that justice requires choking off the finances and pipelines that make attacks possible. India has pressed this case in multilateral forums, including efforts related to the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). Pakistan was removed from the FATF “grey list” in October 2022 after increased monitoring; Indian officials subsequently argued again in international media coverage for tougher financial scrutiny, citing ongoing concerns about facilitation networks across the border.
India has tightened laws and expanded investigative powers to pre‑empt plots and prosecute offenders. Amendments to the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA) in 2019 enabled authorities to designate individuals not just organizations as terrorists, a move by the government as necessary to stop operatives from simply rebranding. India has increasingly used diplomacy to keep victims at the Centre of counterterrorism conversations. Beyond bilateral pressure on Pakistan to act against proscribed actors, New Delhi has cultivated partnerships on intelligence, terror‑finance tracking and online radicalization. In June 2025, for example, the United Kingdom and India discussed deeper counter‑terrorism cooperation in the immediate aftermath of another India‑Pakistan flareup, emphasizing joint work on finance, law enforcement and judicial coordination areas that directly affect whether victims see progress.
None of this unfolds in a vacuum. Pakistan denies state support for militants and contests India’s claims around specific attacks and reprisals. International coverage of crises from Pulwama–Balakot in 2019 to the 2025 strikes shows competing narratives about targets, casualties and who fired first. For India, however, the through‑line has been consistent: act to prevent the next attack, memorialize the dead, care for survivors, and keep international attention on the organizations and facilitators that repeatedly appear in investigations. For Indian victims, that mix of remembrance, justice and prevention is not optional, it is the minimal obligation of a state facing cross‑border extremism.
India’s record since Mumbai, and especially since Pulwama, shows a country that has placed victims of terrorism at the Centre of policy while broadening the toolkit legal, diplomatic, financial and, when necessary, military to confront an ecosystem of violence reported by international media to be anchored in Pakistan‑based groups. Terror networks adapt, financing mutates, and political narratives collide. Yet by sustaining pressure on perpetrators and their sponsors, building coalitions on finance and technology, and ensuring that survivors are seen and supported, India has tried to move the arc of counterterrorism toward justice and deterrence so that fewer families, on either side of a border, ever have to become “victims” in the first place.
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Pakistan’s Defence Minister Khawaja Muhammad Asif has stated that under the new defence agreement, Saudi Arabia will support Islamabad if India launches an attack on Pakistan. The pact is entirely defensive and based on collective security.
In an interview with Geo TV, Pakistan’s Defence Minister Khawaja Muhammad Asif said that Article 5 of the defence agreement signed between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia addresses collective defence. This means that an attack on any partner country will be considered an attack on all parties to the agreement.
Asif said, “The agreement is modeled after NATO, meaning it is defensive and does not provide for offensive action. However, if Pakistan or Saudi Arabia is attacked, we will respond jointly to repel it.”
The full terms of the agreement, signed on 17 September, have not yet been released. Saudi officials have indicated that the pact includes military cooperation and all necessary security measures.
Among Muslim countries, Pakistan is the only one with nuclear weapons. Although economically behind, its six hundred thousand-strong armed forces are considered among the most powerful in the world. Many security experts have described this agreement as a “combination of Saudi riyal support and Pakistani nuclear capability.”
Source: NDTV World
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Kathmandu — Nepal’s recently ousted Prime Minister K.P. Sharma Oli has alleged that his fall from power was directly linked to his firm opposition to India on sensitive territorial and cultural issues.
In a letter to his party’s general secretary, written shortly after his resignation amid mounting Gen-Z-led protests, Oli claimed he would not have lost power had he not challenged India’s position on the Lipulekh region and the birthplace of the Hindu deity Ram.
The core of the Nepal–India dispute lies in the Lipulekh Pass and the Kalapani region, territories both countries claim. Under the 1816 Sugauli Treaty, the Kali River’s origin was designated as the boundary. Nepal maintains that the river begins in Limpiyadhura, placing Lipulekh and Kalapani within its territory. During Oli’s tenure, his government took a hard line, demanding that India halt road construction in the disputed zone.
India, however, insists the Kali River originates near Kalapani village, making the area part of Uttarakhand state. New Delhi further argues that trade with China through Lipulekh has been ongoing since 1954.
Tensions deepened in July 2020 when Oli made a controversial statement, asserting that Lord Ram was not born in India but in Nepal. He claimed the ancient kingdom of Ayodhya was located in Birgunj, eastern Nepal, accusing India of fabricating a “fake Ayodhya.”
“Would Ram have traveled such a long distance from Uttar Pradesh to Janakpur to marry Sita? Such practices did not exist in ancient times,” Oli argued, sparking outrage across India.
Oli now believes his firm stance on these two highly sensitive issues—territorial sovereignty and cultural heritage—was the decisive factor behind his loss of power.
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